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The future of capitalism is not necessarily democratic. Authoritarian capitalism is gaining foothold 
not only in non-democratic states, such as China, but even in countries with strong liberal 
institutions. From Greece to the US, an increasing number of countries show its symptoms. We 
need to look beyond the façade of the most visible political manoeuvres in order to understand 
how economic and political disciplining of citizens to create decent capitalist subjects can be 
combined into a political economic model that ensures accelerated capital accumulation through 
increased political repression. Hungary is one of the most striking cases. Hungarian elites followed 
the good governance blueprints of international institutions, implementing liberal political 
and economic reforms between 1990 and 2010. For long, the country was considered to be a 
frontrunner of the third wave of democratisation1, yet now is considered to be a frontrunner of 
democratic backsliding. Orbán’s political economic model has been stable for eight years now 
- Fidesz gained the same amount of seats at the parliamentary election on 8 April 2018 as four 
years before, and thus Viktor Orbán’s party remains the dominant political force in the country. 
There are obvious direct political reasons for this, such as the heavily gerrymandered electoral 
map, the biased media landscape as well as the divisions paralysing the fractured opposition, 
among others. Yet, to understand the emergence of authoritarian capitalism in Hungary, we have 
to dig deeper into the contradictions of post-socialist liberal policies and institutions to unearth 
its social and economic roots.
Looking behind the Curtains of Hungarian Authoritarian Capitalism
For a decade and a half it seemed that Hungary was on her way to prove Fukuyama right. The country 
was one of the first to liberalise its economy and political system in the second half of the 1980s. 
Nationalist mobilisation during the 1990s was low with centrist politicians dominating the public 
sphere until the end of the 2000s. High levels of foreign direct investment (FDI), a technologically 
complex export structure and well-developed independent institutions characterised the country. 
A bipolar party system emerged, dominated by the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) on the Left 
and the Federation of Young Democrats (FIDESZ), the party of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, on the 
Right. Membership in the EU and other international bodies further strengthened the perception 
of democratic consolidation. Hungary was ranked by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) as the leading post-socialist country based on the Transition Index between 
1995 and 2001 every year consecutively.2
But since 2010, instead of democratic consolidation, Hungary has taken a completely different 
route. Following eight years of government by the coalition of the Socialists and the Liberals, 
Viktor Orbán took power with a sweeping electoral success in 2010 followed by another definitive 
victory in 2014, and a third one in 2018. The ink barely dried on the ministerial nominations in 
2010, when the government started to systematically dismantle the core institutions of liberal 
democracy. The new parliamentarian majority unilaterally passed a new constitution in 2011 
that removed the reference to social rights and included various conservative references among 
others to citizens’ moral responsibility to work. Later, the government systematically restructured 
the media landscape by tightening control over public media and by facilitating the expansion 
of right-wing media oligarchs. In a crucial move, the illiberal state also curtailed the rights of the 
constitutional court as well as attempted to shrink the independence of the judiciary. Governmental 
attacks on civil society, with a special focus on NGOs financed by international donors served 
Lessons from the Political Economy of Authoritarian Capitalism in Hungary   |  3
to delegitimise the extra-parliamentary opposition. The ruling political elite also systematically 
took over independent institutions such as the State Audit Office or the National Bank, with every 
supposedly independent organ of the state controlled by party loyalists. As a reaction to democratic 
backsliding, the European Parliament passed a report3 condemning anti-liberal measures of the 
government. Freedom House ceased to classify Hungary as a consolidated democracy in 2015.4 
How can we explain this puzzling U-turn in democratisation? Liberal institutionalism has been a 
dominant approach in political science and political sociology for the last decades, influencing the 
ways in which public intellectuals, journalists, politicians and activists think about democracy. This 
liberal institutionalist frame of thinking has been infused by an evolutionary theory of change as 
propagated by Francis Fukuyama among others, where a combination of liberal capitalism and 
liberal democracy are considered the endpoint of development. Followers of this train of thought 
have singled out Hungary as one of the most successful cases of democratic consolidation and 
European integration.5 Uncritical of the structural tensions induced by European integration and 
global economic internationalisation, liberal institutionalists were blind to the coming authoritarian 
breakthrough in Eastern Europe right until the election of Orbán. They maintained that Hungary 
was very unlikely to undergo a democratic backsliding given the highly developed liberal institutions 
erected during the years of the post-socialist transition and the effect of EU membership.6 
Institutions are central to a functioning democracy, yet, the failure of the liberal institutionalist 
paradigm to foresee or even to retrospectively explain democratic backsliding in Hungary signals 
the need to go beyond it. Some analysts have turned to look at the behaviour of politicians and the 
extent to which they diverge from liberal norms. They point to Orbán’s political manoeuvring as 
the primary cause of democratic backsliding in Hungary. Commenting on Hungary, Fukuyama for 
example concludes that institutions are not enough to protect liberal democracy: ‘Bad actors can 
undo even the best-designed institutions’, which – according to Fukuyama – highlights the need for 
‘good politicians’ who respect the principles of liberalism and do not destroy liberal institutions, 
even if they have the power to do so.7 Some propose the theory of the ‘post-communist mafia 
state’ portraying Orbán as a Godfather using his political authority to further his own economic 
interests.8 Leading international media outlets have reported on high-profile corruption in Hungary, 
shedding light on the enrichment of Orbán’s closest relatives and friends by misusing EU funds. 
Corruption is definitely rampant, yet, the ties of the governmental elite go beyond friends and 
relatives: Orbán’s socio-economic strategy enjoys the support of the majority of the economic 
elite, both foreign and domestic. 
Too much fascination with the most visible actors on the scene distracts our attention from the 
structure of the play itself. These actors are not dismantling democratic institutions because they 
are “bad”. Instead, they are building a new regime of accumulation, because they want to stay in 
power and increase their wealth. In other words, we should shift our narrative from corruption 
and the collapse of liberal norms and institutions, and start talking about the rise of authoritarian 
capitalism. Understanding this requires analysing why some crucial segments of the society, such 
as the majority of the working class and the economic elite no longer defend the liberal transition 
regime in Hungary.
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The End of the Politics of Patience
Even though for a long time Hungary was a champion in attracting transnational companies, 
the employment rate has been far lower than in the rest of Europe, with a meagre 55 per cent 
employed in 2009, right before the 2010 Orbán break-through.9  A defining characteristic of the 
Hungarian economy was the chronically low level of employment as a result of the substantial 
deindustrialisation during the early years of the transition. A large segment of the society, the 
early victims of the transition – the elderly, the young with little education and those living outside 
the biggest towns of the country – could not take part in the new growth centres of the economy 
dominated by technology intensive multinational companies. Those outside the local hubs of the 
global economy felt increasingly left behind. Hungary’s development path was also characterised 
by chronically low wage levels. The share of wages in total national income decreased from 57.2 
percent to 46.3 percent during the period of the transition.10 Hungarian wages were lagging behind 
average wages in the Central and Eastern European region throughout the 2000s and have long 
been among the lowest throughout the OECD.11
Despite the dismal social performance of the early transition years, the acceptance of the new regime 
remained relatively high until the second half of the 2000s. Scholars described this puzzling high 
legitimacy of the liberal transition regime as the ‘politics of patience’.12 On the one hand, citizens 
were willing to defer consumption for a few more years hoping for a better future. On the other 
hand, post-socialist governments also attempted to pacify the victims of the transition by allowing 
them to retire early and providing generous pension, unemployment and other social benefits. 
Early retirement was  particularly important in providing democratic legitimation in the 1990s. 
The share of early retirees among pensioners grew significantly from the 1980s to the 1990s 
from 33 per cent to 52.7 per cent among women and from 44 per cent to 75.2 per cent among 
men.13 As a result, government debts grew strongly during the early nineties (from 66.3 per cent 
in 1990 to 86.0 per cent in 1994) and then again during the 2000s (from 55 per cent in 2002 to 
80.6 per cent in 2010).14 Incomes through privatisation could offset high state expenditure during 
the mid-nineties, but as assets owned by the state decreased, this channel of financial revenue 
dried up. Fiscal deficits and the growth of public debt were also caused by low taxation of capital 
as the state fiercely competed for foreign investment with other states of the region.15 
The tax base of the Hungarian welfare state was severely skewed toward taxing labour and 
maintaining generous tax holidays for multinational companies. Taxes on capital in Hungary 
represented the smallest share in total tax income among Eastern European countries contributing 
significantly to the weakening of the fiscal capacity of the state and an increasing squeeze on the 
budget.16 Gaping budget deficits and growing government debt brought the necessity of economic 
adjustment in 2006-2007.
As public debts grew, private debts also spiralled due to the credit bubble fuelled dependent 
growth model. To compensate for low wages, the Socialist government between 2002 and 2010 
encouraged financialised consumption through credits: buying cars and homes financed through 
foreign currency loans. This ‘privatised Keynesianism’, as formulated by Colin Crouch, was used in 
several developed countries to reconcile the tensions between capitalism’s tendency to increase 
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social polarisation and democracy’s universal premises.17 After the social democratic compromise 
between labour and capital that sustained the welfare state ended during the 1970s and 1980s, 
the new policy regime of privatised Keynesianism helped to maintain the legitimacy of liberal 
institutions. However, it led to an unsustainable rise in private debts in the core countries as well 
as in Hungary. Between 1999 and 2006, household debt rose more than ten times in nominal 
terms, so that in January 2007 the average outstanding loan amounted to 94 per cent of the 
annual household income in Hungary.18 As a result, by 2009, a year before Orbán’s electoral 
breakthrough, 75 per cent of Hungarians were unable to face unexpected expenses, the highest 
level throughout the EU.19
During the early years of the transition, the social and pension system could counterbalance 
the negative political effect of large scale deindustrialisation, economic liberalisation and the 
uncertainties induced by globalisation, and cushion the downward mobility of the victims of 
economic reform. During the 2000s, as a new generation reached prime working age, boosting 
consumption through private debts emerged as another crucial channel of legitimacy. However, 
both mechanisms of legitimation were exhausted by the end of the 2000s. As a result of brewing 
social tensions, the approval of capitalism in Hungary dropped dramatically from 1991 to 2009.20 
Empirical research has also demonstrated that indebtedness was strongly and significantly 
associated with the political support for Fidesz during the definitive 2010 election.21 The rightward 
shift of the working middle class was strongly facilitated by the breakdown of the private debt 
regime. Voters identifying themselves as members of the working class strongly and significantly 
favoured Fidesz over the Socialists by 2010.22 The era of the politics of patience ended, and the 
growing social and economic turmoil has led to disenchantment among Hungarian citizens.
The Revolt of the Native Capitalist Class
Voters’ disillusionment itself does not necessarily result in authoritarian capitalism. Citizens 
certainly did not vote for the dismantling of social rights and liberal institutions, as Fidesz withheld 
its plans of institutional engineering before the elections in 2010. Bringing down democracy not 
only requires dissatisfied voters, it also needs an active elite that thinks its interest might be 
best furthered by weakening the system of liberal democracy and liberal capitalism. Without the 
consent and sometimes even the active involvement of crucial segments of the economic elite, 
authoritarian capitalism could not have emerged in Hungary. 
Throughout the 1990s, post-socialist governments put heavy emphasis on importing large amounts 
of foreign investment. The total stock of FDI reached 76.2 per cent by 2009, only surpassed by 
the 80.4 per cent of Estonia among Eastern European countries.23 The low level of capital taxation 
led to a financial environment favouring capital intensive multinational companies as opposed to 
labour intensive small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Respective post-socialist governments 
favoured multinational companies with a low corporate tax and generous tax allowances to 
international investors. The high concentration of FDI in the growth sectors of the economy also 
resulted in a geographically highly uneven development during the last 25 years. 
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As a result, the Hungarian economy became divided into two parts: an effective and capital-intensive 
multinational sector that plays only a minor role in job creation, and a stagnant domestic sector, 
with little connection between the two. Development sociologists and structuralist economists 
described this process as structural disarticulation several decades ago.24 The key bearers of power 
in the economy became foreign investors, with close ties to every post-socialist government, but 
especially to the coalition of Socialists and Liberals. Those national entrepreneurs who did not 
manage to become junior partners of international capitalists either as service providers or as 
local suppliers were increasingly pitted against this dominant power bloc.25 The highly dualistic 
nature of the Hungarian economy created a polarisation within the economic elite leading to 
divergent political interests and preferences.
The polarisation of the economic elite became also evident in the divergent political embeddedness 
of the domestic and the international segments of the capitalist class. I analysed the class 
composition of economic policy elites based on a dataset I created through quantitative coding 
using publicly available data on policy elite members’ biographies.26 The analysis revealed that 
there developed a large difference between the class composition of left and right-wing policy 
elites from 1990 to 2014. 36 per cent of the left-of-centre governance elite have a background in 
the multinational sector compared to the 15 per cent of the right-wing governance elite. Similarly, 
centre-left governments were also more strongly connected to the banking sector, with 38 per cent 
of their personnel having ties to banks compared to the 18 per cent of the right-wing economic 
policy elite. These differences are even stronger if we only examine ministers and prime ministers 
– here the 42 per cent of left-wing ministers compares to the 14 per cent of right-wing ministers 
having a tie to the banking sector. Crucially, domestic capitalists were increasingly alienated by 
the coalition of Socialists and Liberals and had a strong interest in helping a new government to 
power that would better facilitate the capital accumulation of native capitalists through addressing 
the severe dualism of the economy and ensuring the supply of cheap and flexible labour.
The Case of the Tobacco Sector
The case of the tobacco sector illustrates how the structural polarisation of the economic elite 
facilitated the anti-liberal intervention into the economy. Two years after taking power, Viktor 
Orbán’s government initiated a complete restructuring of the tobacco industry, resulting in the 
CXXIV (2012) law which radically changed the regulation of the market for tobacco products.27 
Before the transition, the tobacco industry was dominated by four companies, operating in four 
towns. These companies were all privatised during the 1990s and the biggest companies were 
bought by international investors. A smaller, Hungarian owned company, Continental managed 
to establish a foothold in the tobacco industry when an international investor sold its plant in 
one of the towns.
The law to “curtail smoking among young and regulate tobacco retail trade” was introduced to the 
Parliament in December 2011. The lead architect of the law was János Lázár, the second strongest 
man in the government, a close ally to Orbán. The regulations granted the state the monopoly 
on granting tobacco trade concessions. A year later oppositional MPs noticed by checking the 
file properties that the Word document sent out to Brussels to the European Commission for 
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consultation was not authored by government officials but by János Sánta – the chairman of the 
Hungarian Tobacco Alliance (the central lobby body of the industry) who also happens to be 
manager and owner of Continental Tobacco, the only Hungarian owned company in the tobacco 
sector. When asked by journalists about the incident, János Lázár replied that he had known 
János Sánta for ten years and that he sent out the draft for commenting to every major tobacco 
company, however the foreign owned companies had not supported the bill.
János Sánta and his company were not only active in drafting the bill, but also were the big 
winners in the right to trade. The owners, employees and even their family members are among 
the biggest winners of the bid for concessions, with more than 1000 new retail outlets run by 
someone closely connected to Continental. János Sánta was publicly encouraging members of the 
company to take part in the tender and stated that it is a “similar historical opportunity as land 
redistribution in 1945”. CBA, the biggest Hungarian owned retail chain in the country, were also 
significant winners – not surprisingly owned by enthusiastic public supporters of the Hungarian 
Right. Finally a third important group of winners were families and entrepreneurs connected to 
influential politicians in alliance with Orbán.
Native capitalists, excluded from the most lucrative segments of the tobacco industry dominated 
by multinationals, were behind the restructuring of the tobacco industry. A similar process can 
be seen in the restructuring of the banking and the energy sectors, as well as the restructuring 
of the labour code – all of which have helped to facilitate the capital accumulation of national 
capitalists. The connectedness of the domestic capitalist class to right-wing government has been 
increasing throughout the transition years. Although right-wing governments were always more 
detached from the dominant segments of the capitalist class, the post-2010 illiberal regime has 
been particularly insulated from the multinational and the banking sector and has gained much 
of its political support from national capitalists’ alienation from the liberal transition regime.
A capitalism that needs authoritarian solutions
Being involved in labour intensive production the accelerated capital accumulation of the native 
capitalist class rests on cheap and flexible labour, and on access to markets dominated by 
multinationals. To achieve their accelerated capital accumulation, the government systematically 
interfered in the existing structure of property and social rights, dismantled trade unions and 
all major institutional forms that represent the socially vulnerable. Although Orbán won in 
2010 with the support of the working middle class, his neoconservative authoritarian policies 
favour the upper middle class and the economic elite and have alienated a large segment of his 
former working class supporters. Between 2014 and 2018, real incomes and the employment 
rate have risen somewhat which helped Fidesz to stabilise its support among the working class, 
but the bottom forty per cent has remained on the losing side of Orbán’s economic policies. 
The redirection of class cleavages and distributional conflicts along cultural lines targeting the 
‘undeserving poor’, various minorities as well as migrants serves to pre-empt a potential working 
class backlash. Targeting the figure of George Soros in the most recent parliamentary election 
was a strategic move to connect the enemy images of the reckless global investor and the fearful 
migrant, portraying both as threats to the vulnerable working class.
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The measures favouring the nationalist economic elite also put Orbán’s regime in opposition to 
some multinational companies that were among the biggest beneficiaries of the liberal transition 
regime, and also to smaller domestic entrepreneurs who blocked the ambitions of the national 
capitalists. Although Orbán facilitates the growth of the domestic capitalist elite, he knows that 
he cannot fundamentally challenge major international investors. Thus, he attempts to pacify 
transnational companies through strategic partnerships and record-low 9 per cent corporate 
tax. The new power bloc behind the state is composed of the political class around Orbán, key 
segments of the domestic business elite and transnational corporations. To protect against a 
possible political backlash emanating from the losers of accelerated capital accumulation, the 
institutions of liberal democracy had to be curtailed in parallel to the dismantling of the institutions 
of liberal capitalism and social rights. In other words, Orbán’s authoritarianism cannot be separated 
from the model of capitalism he builds. 
Lessons for Progressive Theory and Practice 
It would be difficult to find a country that adhered to neoliberal blueprints of good governance 
more closely than Hungary. Yet, this did not facilitate democratic stabilisation, but the opposite. 
Authoritarian capitalism in Hungary was born on the ruins of liberal institutions and policies. 
The twenty years of transition followed by the break-through of authoritarian capitalism offer 
critical lessons for social theory and political practice beyond Hungary. First, Hungary’s experience 
points to the inherent tendency of capitalism to polarise society which can alienate significant 
segments of voters. The growing commodification of social relations and the resulting insecurity 
and anxiety provide a fertile ground for anti-liberal political movements not only in Hungary, but 
in the US, in the UK or on the old continent alike.28 The demobilisation and rightward shift of the 
Hungarian working class shows that democracy has to perform socially to be sustainable. The 
increase of private debts, the chronically low level of employment and wages, as well as the low 
fiscal capacity of the state to maintain its social policies signify the limits of the liberal economic 
model. Designing social and economic policies that are able to guarantee more social security, 
more inclusion and more opportunities for everyone are indispensable for a socially sustainable 
democracy.
Second, liberal political theory maintains that the capitalist class has a natural tendency to support 
liberal democracy. Several experts, followers of shock therapy economics, proposed during 
the early transition years to proceed with economic reforms rapidly before political reforms in 
order to produce a strong bourgeoisie that would support further democratisation.29 The case 
of Hungary shows that the dynamics of global economic integration might lead to completely 
opposite outcomes. As long as they are willing to play by the rules of the regime, national capitalists 
receive wide ranging support from the authoritarian state, hurting existing ownership or other 
enshrined rights of multinationals, workers and small and medium sized enterprises. The class 
of national capitalists and the political class dominated by Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz are mutually 
constitutive. There is nothing inherently liberal in the propertied class that emerged during the 
transition from socialism to capitalism. Sustainable democratisation has to be also built on an 
inclusive economic structure that does not marginalise domestic producers and does not result 
in a dualistic economy. There are some industrial policies that are compatible with the global 
economy,30 but the regime of global economic governance also needs to be reformed to allow 
for more state autonomy and economic development.
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The case of Hungary is not an isolated example. Historically, the collapse of democracy in Germany 
during the first half of the twentieth century offers a comparable lesson. As Karl Polányi and 
others pointed out, in the Weimar Republic the Left failed to present a compelling alternative 
to the unchecked globalisation of the gold standard that was directly responsible for financial 
instability, high levels of unemployment and a downward pressure on wages.31 This facilitated 
the rightward shift of the working class. The economic elite found a way to live with the new 
authoritarian regime, several investors even enjoyed new opportunities for growth. The cultural 
and political context differs, so the extreme form of Nazism is less of a threat today as a hundred 
years ago, but the political economy of authoritarian capitalism reveals striking similarities. The 
rightward shift of the working middle class is a widespread phenomenon today where centrist 
social democrats failed to maintain their attachment to the institutions and values of the labour 
movement. On the other hand, China, Russia or Turkey offer further examples of how capitalists 
can indeed make compromise with authoritarian regimes as long as they see an opportunity for 
accumulation. 
Defying liberal expectations, authoritarian capitalism is not just possible, but an increasingly 
common phenomenon today. Hungary is not an outlier, but again a frontrunner of a global tendency 
that Mark Blyth describes as “global Trumpism”, with authoritarian capitalism as the endpoint. 
Technocratic rule as in the case of Greece (or Chile under Pinochet) imposes economic discipline 
from above in the name of neoliberalism, whereas Hungarian authoritarian capitalism, or in a 
more moderate form American Trumpism, is a counter-reaction to neoliberalism propelled by 
the discontent of workers and the economic elite. However, all of these political economic models 
signify that political disciplining can be the precondition of economic disciplining of citizens to 
facilitate accelerated capital accumulation in the era of contemporary global capital flows. 
The tensions between capitalism and democracy are much stronger than most social scientists 
and political theorists predicted. These authoritarian tendencies show that there is nothing 
inherently democratic in capitalist arrangements. Although democracy historically developed in 
societies with market institutions, capitalism is not a guarantee for democratic institutions. In 
fact, societies with the longest history of successful democratisation managed to institutionalise 
a compromise between social groups struggling to curtail the logic of capital on the one hand and 
capitalist groups on the other. Putting these political tensions into ideological brackets, as liberal 
institutionalists did, does not serve the purpose of democracy. Instead of negating it, progressives 
have to master the paradox of democratic capitalism. The future of successful democratisation 
depends on how the structural tensions of simultaneous democratisation and marketisation are 
resolved. International institutions, donors and democracy promoters have to focus on the broad 
context of democratic institutions and facilitate a civil society that offers credible solutions to social 
and economic problems as well. Global initiatives to promote democracy cannot work if they are 
overshadowed by global economic procedures that increase financial and social vulnerability. 
Unchecked financial and economic liberalisation is not compatible with democratisation. The 
institutional structure of the European Union as well as global multilateral institutions need to 
be reformed to reflect this lesson. 
These reforms will not happen without a constant push from civil society, trade unions and 
progressive parties. Domestic political actors have to reject the false marriage of economic and 
political liberalism, and combine the promotion of democratic institutions with the promotion of 
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economic and social inclusion. Progressives cannot pit identity politics, the protection of minorities, 
against the politics of redistribution. Progressives have to offer a politics of social security to the 
vulnerable working middle class clutching onto the security of national identity. This requires 
thorough institutional reforms, brave initiatives such as universal basic income32, new forms of 
social movements and new party structures that facilitate the mobilisation and participation of 
masses in the democratic struggle. Popular participation in politics is a necessary requirement 
of democratic stabilisation.
The global financial crisis was apparently not enough to challenge the dominant free market vision 
of society which contributed to the rise in right-wing authoritarianism. To reverse this trend we 
need to restore a critical class analysis of the tensions inherent to democratic capitalism, and 
create the cross-class alliances that could propel contemporary social democratic politics back to 
power. Progressive politics has to reinvent the basic values of social democracy and simultaneously 
adapt social citizenship to the twenty-first century. A democratic developmental state with an 
open economy industrial policy and a restructuring of global economic governance is necessary 
to facilitate economic development for all. 
As opposed to the optimist prediction of Fukuyama, today’s future seems to be much bleaker 
and occupied by authoritarian tendencies. Reinventing progressive analysis and politics is the 
pre-condition to stop the spread of authoritarian capitalism throughout the world.
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Hungary was once praised as an example of successful democratisation 
and EU integration, but now has joined the ranks of ‘liberal’ nations 
backsliding into authoritarianism. Many commentators blame Orbán 
and his anti-migrant, anti-EU populist rhetoric, but ignore the underlying 
causes in particular the failings of market reforms in the country, high 
unemployment, low wages, spiralling household debts, and a nationalist 
capitalist class resentful of the advantages given to their transnational 
capitalist competitors. 
